The Truce Between the U.S. and Iran Was the Easy Part
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In conflicts between countries, wars are often fought to improve bargaining positions. Is the United States now in a better position to get what it wants from Iran in negotiations—or worse?
The framework of the deal that Trump has outlined—the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, the end of the U.S. blockade on Iran, and an end to military strikes—is itself vague, and many important issues, such as the scope and scale of any economic relief for Iran, the status of Israel’s war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the future of Iran’s nuclear program, are unresolved. Because of these uncertainties, even if the shaky peace holds, the United States and Iran will be constantly negotiating over the details and next steps. Unfortunately, the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran may have left the United States less able to extract concessions from Tehran despite the war’s heavy cost.
In conflicts between countries, wars are often fought to improve bargaining positions. Is the United States now in a better position to get what it wants from Iran in negotiations—or worse?
The framework of the deal that Trump has outlined—the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, the end of the U.S. blockade on Iran, and an end to military strikes—is itself vague, and many important issues, such as the scope and scale of any economic relief for Iran, the status of Israel’s war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the future of Iran’s nuclear program, are unresolved. Because of these uncertainties, even if the shaky peace holds, the United States and Iran will be constantly negotiating over the details and next steps. Unfortunately, the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran may have left the United States less able to extract concessions from Tehran despite the war’s heavy cost.
Although U.S. war aims were muddled from the start of the campaign on Feb. 28, statements by the president and senior leaders expressed both ambitious goals, such as regime change, and more modest ones, including setting back Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and reducing its support for regional proxies such as Hezbollah. Even if only the more modest goals are considered, the United States is in a weaker position than it was before the conflict began.
To be clear, the United States and Israel hit Iran hard. The war began with a series of devastating airstrikes that killed hundreds of senior Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and numerous senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and intelligence officials. Iran’s nuclear program, already set back after U.S. and Israeli strikes in 2025, was hit yet again, and the country’s pitiful surface fleet was largely obliterated. The United States and Israel also destroyed around a third of Iran’s missile arsenal, less than initially claimed but still a significant percentage.
Economically, the war and U.S. blockade further devastated Iran’s already weak economy—Iranian leaders dismiss this publicly with defiant claims of resistance, but their constant demands for economic relief as part of any deal suggest the opposite. Before the war, Israel had already devastated Hamas in Gaza and damaged Hezbollah in Lebanon, and this year’s Israeli strikes on Hezbollah have further reduced its power, with Israel now occupying a buffer zone in Lebanon.
Iran, however, not only survived this campaign but also hit back hard. Its rockets, missiles, and drones struck at the oil and other infrastructure of the United States’ Persian Gulf allies, destroyed U.S. aircraft, and hit U.S. bases. Hezbollah continued attacks on northern Israel despite Israeli ground and air operations against the group. Most consequentially, Iran succeeded in largely closing the Strait of Hormuz, preventing the free flow of oil, gas, and other products, which led to price spikes and disruptions around the world.
As the United States and Iran negotiate in the coming months, Tehran will have more leverage. The biggest source comes from Iran’s ability to close the strait, which it demonstrated for the first time in this war. Despite numerous confrontations with Iran in the past, including the 2025 U.S. and Israeli campaign, Tehran avoided closing the strait, seeing it as an option of last resort, in part because such an action could unite the world against Iran even while failing due to U.S. military power. Neither outcome happened. Despite a massive U.S. and Israeli bombing campaign and then months of occasional strikes, the Strait of Hormuz remained closed.
The United States also lost ground on one of its most important sources of leverage—its allies. The U.S. decision not to consult with European or most other allies before launching the war, and the subsequent U.S. condemnations of allies for not helping, led some countries to stand up to the administration, revealing a deep divide over the war despite allies’ greater dependence on imported oil and gas.
Within the Middle East, key allies such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar may have unlocked Iranian funds as a way to stop Iranian escalation against Gulf states. Some, such as the UAE, have moved closer to the United States and Israel, but others question the reliability of Washington.
The president will feel criticisms from this group most keenly.
It’s complicated but not this month, most likely.
Even Israel and the United States are now divided. Israelis bet in the Trump casino, hoping to win it all, but they may have lost everything. For the United States, opening the strait is vital, but Israel has many other concerns. Several senior Israeli officials have denounced the latest deal, believing that it does not resolve the all-important nuclear issue and Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile program, and they likely fear that it may allow Hezbollah to rebuild in Lebanon, among other complaints. (Many Israelis also seek to discredit Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel enters election season.) The two close allies are now divided.
Iran is also more likely to use this leverage than it was before the latest campaign began. Khamenei combined aggressive rhetoric with caution when it came to a confrontation with the United States. Iran’s new leaders may feel emboldened: They have survived the U.S. and Israeli onslaught and regime change campaign, remained on their feet, and even inflicted harm on their adversaries.
The coming months will reveal whether the United States can transform a costly and contentious military campaign into a diplomatic success. Washington will need to restore allied confidence, bolster deterrence, and impose meaningful constraints on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Otherwise, Tehran will be more confident that in future crises, it can divide the United States from its allies, manage the devastation of the war, and impose costs on the United States and its allies.
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage. Read more here.
Daniel Byman is a professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the director of the Warfare and Irregular Threats Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His latest book is Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism. X: @dbyman
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The president will feel criticisms from this group most keenly.
It’s complicated but not this month, most likely.